Adaptation to climate change is gaining increasing relevance in the public debate of climate policy. However, detailed and regionalised cost estimates as a basis for cost-benefit-analyses are rare. We compose available cost estimates for adaptation in Europe, and in particular Germany, Finland and Italy. Furthermore, a systematic overview on fiscal aspects of adaptation is provided, with focus on budgetary effects of adaptation in the different impact sectors. Combining cost estimates, considerations on fiscal aspects and governmental interventions in adaptation processes, we present data-based guesses of public adaptation costs in the EU, divided by impact sectors. The findings show an expectedly large public burden in the adaptation of transport infrastructure and coastal protection, while high adaptation costs in the agriculture sector are predominantly private. The change in energy demand may well lead to a significant decrease in public expenditure. Considering the regional heterogeneity of adaptation measures and the high uncertainty of quantitative adaptation analyses, further research in the form of bottom-up-studies is needed. JEL-Code: H54, Q54, Q58.
INTRODUCTION
Beside the mitigation of greenhouse gases, adaptation is another way to respond to climate change. The IPCC defines adaptation as the "Adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities." (IPCC 2007, p. 869) . Although this definition has its strength in the inclusion of both observed and expected climate change, as well as covering both positive and negative climate impacts, it also leaves some open questions. In particular, when applying the definition to observed activities, it often remains unclear whether activities are solely attributed to climatic stimuli. It may also be the case that structural changes, economic development, changes in risk perception or other non-climate-related triggers play a role. This fundamental problem of defining adaptation may be one main reason for the current scarcity of quantitative data on adaptation measures and their costs.
Adaptation can be classified according to the actors and the time horizon. In the according literature we find the expressions private, individual, decentralised or autonomous adaptation for such adaptation measures which constitute private goods and are regularly taken by private actors (Mendelsohn 2000 , Fankhauser 1998 , OECD 2008 . The existence (and in some impact sectors the predominance) of private adaptation options reveals one main difference to mitigation efforts, which are characterised by the existence of large-scale public interventions (Tol 2005) . But there are also adaptation measures which call for collective action, since beneficiaries and decision makers are not totally identical. There are different expressions to be found in the literature, with different accentuations. Joint and collective adaptation highlight the difference to private adaptation and the need for collective action (which can principally be organised by privates), whereas planned, governmental and public adaptation imply that these activities are taken by some governmental entity (Mendelsohn 2000 , IPCC 2007 , Dannenberg et al. 2009 , Smith et al. 2009 ). Regarding the time horizon, one can distinguish proactive and reactive adaptation (Fankhauser 1998) . The former means adaptation to expected future climatic changes, whereas the latter reacts to observed climate change. This paper focuses on the fiscal effects of adaptation to climate change. Beside adaptation induced effects, climate change has other fiscal implications, like public spending for mitigation efforts, the implementation and use of fiscal instruments in climate policy, or reduced tax revenue due to productivity losses in the economy. Concentrating on adaptation, we will proceed as follows: In the next section we will summarise available cost estimates for adaptation measures in Europe. The fiscal aspects of adaptation will be analysed and categorised in section 0, followed by an argumentation where public involvement in adaptation is reasoned. After laying the theoretical and empirical ground, we will then draw conclusions regarding the direct fiscal adaptation costs in various impact sectors in Europe in section 4.2. Section 5 summarises the main findings.
ADAPTATION COSTS IN EUROPE -A LITERATURE REVIEW IN MATRIX FORMAT
We compile the results from a literature review on adaptation costs in Europe, all in p.a.-values in € in prices of 2005. Beside studies covering all of Europe, we also include quantitative estimates for three exemplary countries from different climatic zones, namely Finland, Germany and Italy. Thereby we also show research foci and knowledge gaps and present the current state of research with regard to adaptation costs in Europe, in both bottomup and top-down studies.
Studies focussing on the vulnerability to climate change mostly incorporate adaptation needs and often stress the case for a proactive, precautionary climate policy which includes adaptation. However, although most scholars propose a cost-benefit-approach to find the optimal adaptation path, the knowledge of concrete adaptation costs is limited, as can be seen by many empty gaps in the matrix. Furthermore, results base on different scenarios and time horizons.
It should be stated that almost all data and estimates are direct adaptation costs, which do not include indirect costs resulting from forgone profits or feedback effects on consumption due to altered investment and consumption behaviour (opportunity costs). Only very few studies try to give an insight into these effects, for example Bosello et al. (2007) through a CGE approach. These indirect effects might be considerable in many cases. Unfortunately, the current state of research does not allow a reasonable statement concerning indirect effects. So we are forced to focus on direct adaptation costs which result from simple investment or maintenance costs. For information on the matrix, e.g. about annualisation, exchange rates and inflation, we refer to the appendix of this paper. 
FISCAL AND BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF ADAPTATION -AN OVERVIEW
The differentiation between "fiscal" and "budgetary" is crucial to determine the scope of this paper. Before turning to budgetary effects in detail, it has to be clarified how they can be structured and how they are related to the frequently used term "fiscal implications".
Fiscal policy means governmental action to influence the economy by public expenditure and income (Mankiw 2003) . This means fiscal implications encompass both fiscal instruments to pursue certain policy targets as well as effects on the government's balance. In the literature, we can find mainly two different concepts of the terms "fiscal implications" or "fiscal effects". Some authors refer to impacts that fiscal policy has on other variables (e.g. fiscal effects on mortgage debt or independence of the central bank; see Bell and Wray 2002, Wolswijk 2005) . These concepts highlight the importance of fiscal instruments in the fiscal implication analysis. However, most authors understand fiscal effects as an impact of an exogenous variable (some policy, some shock or a gradual development) on the government's expenditure and revenue, so the main focus is actually the effect on the government's budget (e.g. Matsusaka 1995 , Swaroop et al. 2000 , Storesletten 2000 . To make the difference between these two concepts clear, we will refer to the latter as analysis of "budgetary effects"
instead of using the term "fiscal". In contrast to the definition of fiscal policy, the concept of budgetary effects neglects the targets pursued by the fiscal policy and solely analyses changes in government's expenditure and revenue flows. Likewise, in this contribution we will stick to this concept and focus just on the budgetary effects of adaptation to climate change. Fiscal instruments related to adaptation are not of relevance for this paper and remain an issue of future research.
The sign of the total impact of adaptation on the public budgets is not clear. Compared to a baseline scenario with climate change but without adaptation, it can be positive as long as adaptation yields net benefits (mainly in the form of reduced or avoided damages) and thereby increases the total economy's productivity. But if, where, when and to which extent these benefits occur, is by no means certain (Heal and Kriström 2002 , Patt et al. 2009 , World Bank 2009 ). Given the high uncertainty of future climate impacts the total budgetary effects of adaptation may also be negative, even when benefits of adaptation are taken into account. As an example think of the construction costs of a dike in expectation of a rising sea-level, and after the construction it turns out that the sea-level does not rise to the expected extent.
As a first step to assess budgetary effects, this contribution will concentrate on the effects of adaptation costs, mostly ignoring the benefits. This basically has two reasons: First, the magnitude of benefits is highly uncertain ( The second reason comes from the intertemporal heterogeneity of adaptation. One can assume that costs arise today, whereas most benefits occur in later periods (Fankhauser et al. 1999 , Mendelsohn 2000 . The same holds true for negative and positive budgetary effects, respectively. Although public budgets can comparably easily smooth income over time, the short term balance of public budgets is still an issue of interest, at least in the face of the European stability and growth pact, which i.a. schedules a procedure in order to prevent excessive deficits (more than 3% of GDP) in the Euro-area (European Council 1997).
Therefore, the short term budgetary impacts of adaptation costs are indeed of interest, even in the absence of a comprehensive long-term-oriented cost-benefit-analysis.
We will furthermore restrict our analysis to an aggregate view of public budgets. In Europe there are authorities on multiple levels with specific budgetary responsibilities and characteristics. Determining which federal level is in charge for which policy measure is rarely an easy task (see e.g. Farber 2009 as a contribution with regard to adaptation). For the different public actors, like municipalities, states, countries or supranational communities it matters on which level the responsibility is taken. These questions often give rise to controversial debates. However, we will view the public planner as one, neglecting these issues of federal division of responsibilities, in order to get a first insight into the budgetary effects connected to adaptation. After this first step, the disaggregation into the relevant fiscal levels would be an essential task for future research.
Impacts on the government's budget due to adaptation can be disentangled in direct and indirect effects (or first and second round effects to approximately 87% of the total. For the case of adaptation the net budgetary impact of these second-round effects is not obvious. We will disentangle the indirect effects in the subsequent sections.
In basic economic theory, it is assumed that companies adapt only if adaptation increases their profitability (see e.g. Mendelsohn 2000 , OECD 2008 ). Compared to a scenario with climate change but without adaptation, the simplifying assumption of efficient adaptation suggests a clearly positive impact on tax revenue. However, considering timing, uncertainty and other sources of inefficiency, net effects on the public budgets may also be negative. Short-term negative impacts may arise from adaptation measures which cost (and thereby reduce the taxable income) today, while the benefits may only occur in the long run (Fankhauser et al. 1999 ). Uncertainty of future climate impacts and consequently of the effectiveness of adaptation yields further risks of costs exceeding benefits even in the long run (Mendelsohn 2000 , OECD 2008 . Moreover, myopic behaviour of companies and individuals as well as financial constraints may hamper efficient adaptation processes. If these drawbacks reduce the company's overall productivity, the tax revenue also tends to decline.
So far we only considered the impact on the company-level. We will now turn to the total economy. As company resources are limited, funds that have been spent for any non-adaptive activity X, must now be spent on adaptation (activity A). Effectively, demand shifts from the sector providing activity X to the sector providing activity A. Given different effective tax rates for different sectors, the tax revenue may change due to a shift of production towards adaptation-oriented sectors (e.g. construction or manufacture). In other words, the sign of the indirect budgetary effects of autonomous adaptation hinges on the question whether production in the adaptation-oriented sector A yields relatively higher or lower tax revenue than the sector X where demand declines.
Under certain conditions an adaptation-induced shift of production can also lead to changes in the sectoral employment, such that labour demand follows the demand shift. This, in turn, can have positive or negative impacts on the government's budget, depending on the sectorspecific labour market situation.
Further indirect effects may arise in the context of open economies. A country with a relatively high competitiveness in adaptation technologies will possibly gain earnings from a global increase of adaptation demand, and probably achieve higher public revenues. On the contrary, countries which import adaptation technologies and where adaptation demand crowds out domestic demand would feel additional pressure on their productivity and consequently budgets. In this section we gave a short overview on what fiscal implications with regard to adaptation may actually mean. First, we distinguished fiscal implications (which may incur budgetary effects as well as fiscal instruments and have to be seen in connection to policy targets) from sole budgetary effects. We furthermore described direct vs. indirect budgetary effects of adaptation and mentioned the probably high relevance of a binding international adaptation funding agreement. In the next section, we will deepen the analysis in one specific kind of budgetary effects, and introduce a method to reasonably guess the actual public burden of adaptation.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC SHARES OF SECTORAL ADAPTATION COSTS
For the remainder of the paper we will focus on one specific part of the budgetary effects, namely direct expenditures for adaptive investments by the public sector. The reason for this limitation is mainly the current state of data. Although indirect effects may have a high relevance for the sustainability of public budgets, quantitative data are sparse or non-existent.
However, though the limitation on direct expenditures may be a serious drawback in terms of budget forecast, it still allows the introduction of a method which is new in literature and gives first insights into possible budgetary burdens due to adaptation.
We will base our analysis on an approach firstly used by IMF (2008) . The authors present expected public adaptation investments in some of the impact sectors by using absolute adaptation cost estimates by UNFCCC (2007) and applying rough sector-specific ratios of public engagement. We will develop this method further by including more impact sectors and introducing theoretically and empirically grounded determinants for public shares in each impact sector. In section 4.1, possible reasons for public intervention in adaptation processes are shortly identified, leading to a proposed public share of adaptation costs in section 4.2.
Consecutively, these ratios combined with the adaptation costs from the literature give first quantitative insights into direct budgetary effects of adaptation to climate change. 
Theory of public adaptation
The differentiation of public and private adaptation is crucial for determining the budgetary effects of adaptation. In cases where the government takes the responsibility it may come to direct public expenditures. Governmental intervention into markets can be reasoned by (a) market failures, (b) equity aspects and (c) security of supply considerations. Budgetary effects developments. They are, however, not the topic of this paper. The point here is simply that remittances will add to the budgetary burden in developed countries. 3 Due to a lack of detailed data, we could not use the cost estimates in the cross-sectoral impact sector "Extreme weather events". Admittedly, according to the literature review the highest adaptation costs may be expected there. But as there is no information available which actors are affected by these costs and how exactly the costs arise, it is to date not possible to determine the specific degree of governmental affection. Therefore the used methodology can not be applied here.
can furthermore occur if governmental entities engage in economic behaviour like private shareholders.
Market failures occur when perfect market conditions are violated and inefficient allocations of goods and services are the outcome. This is in line with the definition by Bator (1958) ,
where an idealised system of price-market institutions fails to sustain desirable consumption or production activities. Putting it the other way around market efficiency means that competitive market solutions will lead to Pareto efficient solutions.
The reasons for market failure are imbalanced market power, incomplete information, externalities or public goods issues. In environmental economics as well as adaptation processes especially the two last aspects can become relevant. Based on the description of Cornes and Sandler (1986) Public goods can be categorised as a special case of externalities (Bator 1958 , Buchanan and Stubblebine 1962 , Cornes and Sandler 1986 , and are regularly provided by the government.
Pure public goods contain two central qualities namely non-excludability and non-rivalry in consumption (Cowen 1988, Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998) , basing also on Samuelson's theoretical framework (1954) . An example with regard to adaptation processes is the implementation of early-warning-systems with publicly issued warnings. Another important example facilitating adaptation processes is the building of a knowledge base and dissemination of information on climate effects.
However, non-excludability and non-rivalry in consumption with regard to public adaptation goods is not always fully given. The impacts of climate change are mainly on a regional or local level and therefore the adaptation measures benefit only a part of the population. Dykes protect only the people who live in areas in which floods are a likely risk. Therefore they are called local public goods. An efficient outcome of publicly taken adaptation measures on pure or impure public goods requires the cooperation of local, regional and national governments as well as supranational entities.
Equity aspects can justify government intervention even in the absence of market failure.
Equity principles can be differentiated into horizontal and vertical fairness (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980) . Horizontal equity refers to the equal treatment of individuals, but if viewed on a national perspective horizontal equity can easily be extended to the equal treatment of regions or agglomerations. Vertical equity considers the different abilities to afford adaptation measures.
Adaptation processes solely based on cost efficiency may not be considered as just (Mendelsohn 2000) . For example the protection of one region from floods may be worth on cost-benefit criteria but for another region this might not apply. Horizontal equity, in contrast, would call for an equal treatment of both regions (and ultimately their inhabitants and users).
Vertical equity would give case for the support of citizens in need which cannot afford certain adaptation goods. This shows that decisions based on pure cost-efficiency may well interfere with equity targets of the society.
However, governments take the responsibility for adaptation measures of basic needs -even if they are not cost efficient -to ensure a minimal level of care for inhabitants in need. In social welfare states this is reasoned by the democratic voting process, where the voters can put pressure on the parliament. But also supranational regulations take social rights into account and demand from the countries social justice (see International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA resolution 2200A). In any case the pursuing of horizontal and vertical equity will call for governmental intervention into adaptation processes and thereby increases the fiscal effects.
The governmental task to secure the supply of special goods is another reason for public action. The focus lies on elementary goods and services such as food, water and energy. All these sectors will have to adapt to changing climate, in due consideration of a secure supply.
The energy sector is a special case for concerns about the security of supply and plays an important role in policy (Abbott 2001 , Helm 2002 , Barreto and Turton 2005 . Beside network securities the diversification of energy resources and ensuring fairly and stable prices for investment decisions are aspects of security of supply within the energy market (Helm 2002 ).
The security of supply has to be differentiated from pure supply issues, because the guarantee of supply is an additional service which may have characteristics of a public good (Abbott 2001) . Governmental action can proof as necessary to secure the provision of the goods itself and to secure the delivery. Water and energy transmission systems are typical examples where network externalities occur and a monopolistic provider can offer the service at lower costs than a competitive market. Therefore governments regularly intervene by regulating prices.
However, they intervene even beyond market failure rationales. The value of a secure supply itself is seen as a reason for setting legal frameworks and other interventions which foster an enduring supply of elementary goods. The Federal Network Agency in Germany serves as an example. This public institution not only regulates transmission prices, but also commits network operators to ensure an uninterrupted supply. Another example is the provision of drinking water during an extreme drought. The scarcity will lead to higher prices due to their price inelasticity at least in the short run. Although this will lead to market clearance and efficient outcomes, this might be unacceptable concerning public welfare. From this point of view, public action is required to ensure the satisfaction of basic human needs.
In addition to fulfilling the tasks of a social planner in the case of market failure and for reasons of equity and security of supply, the government may engage economically in impact sectors. Like private foresters, energy suppliers and house-owners, the government may act in these markets as a profit-oriented market actor, which will have considerable effects on the public budgets. An obvious example is the ownership and maintenance (heating and cooling) of public buildings like schools and public administration buildings. But governmental engagement in economic processes also occurs in the forestry sector (government as owner of forests) and in energy supply (publicly owned transmission system operators).
It should be noted that the analysis of budgetary effects through public ownership is totally different from the argumentation of governmental intervention in social planner tasks. While in the first case the government behaves basically as a private market participant; in the latter case it acts based on its sovereignty. In the first case it finances its activities by income reflecting the costs (at least this is principally possible); in the latter case the intervention is financed by tax revenue. However, both public activities cause budgetary effects and will therefore be examined commonly in this analysis, although their nature is so different. For the interpretation of results later on, it should be kept in mind that costs arising from public ownership may be "outsourced" (i.e. privatised) more easily than social planner tasks. Since these developments are hard to predict, we will base our analysis on the conditions found today.
Proposal of Public Shares per Sector

Agriculture
The estimates in literature have a large range. Fischer et al. (2007) agricultural production has a large share of the GDP, adaptation costs could lead to negative effects on its national or regional welfare. Also in the EU, where the economic importance of the agricultural production is relatively low, there are differences between the member states.
Countries with a lower per capita income, particularly new member states, show a higher dependency on agriculture than richer member states. Moreover, the impacts of climate change may benefit Northern Europe while the Southern member states are rather disadvantaged. Therefore intergovernmental transfers would help to balance the inequalities. 
Forestry
There are no specific data available about adaptation costs in the European forestry sector, so Furthermore it takes positive externalities of forests into account. These are for instance their CO 2 compensation capacities, their positive effects on regional microclimates, on biodiversity and on local recreation. Finally, the state is owner of forests itself. The average share of total public ownership weighted by the production size is around 40% (own calculations based on Eurostat data). The shares in the different member states vary largely, such that a European mean value (even a weighted one) has to be interpreted with caution. This ownership approach can only serve as a first assessment about public shares of adaptation expenditures.
Together with actions as a social planner, the actual share of total adaptation costs is somewhat higher than the ownership share. We propose a share applicable in Europe of around 45%.
Flood Protection
Summarised, the cost estimates for flood protection measures in Europe amount to annual costs of 281 to 4,022 million € for coastal protection in the EU, assuming different scenarios regarding sea level rise. Flood protection is a prime example for a public good. It resembles a form of joint adaptation which has to be provided by collective action and in most cases will 
Energy Supply
The energy industry plays a central role in the climate change debate. But most of the scientific and public discussion concerns mitigation in the energy sector. For adaptation, the literature suggests following cost estimates: 563 million € p.a. in the 2060s for undefined adaptation measures in Western Europe; 1 billion € in 2050 for cooling measures in thermal power plants in the EU27 plus Norway and Switzerland. Energy networks have always been regulated in some way due to network externalities. In the EU member states, the regulation itself is currently characterised by two slightly different strategies. In both alternatives the network is operated by a transmission system operator (TSO), which is separated from the generating companies (legally, by management or by ownership, see Sioshansi and Pfaffenberger 2006) . Either the TSOs are private companies, regulated by a governmental authority (e.g. the Federal Network Agency in Germany), which sets price ceilings or returnon-investment-ceilings. Moreover, TSOs are legally committed to secure an enduring energy supply. In the other alternative TSOs are publicly owned companies, as it is the case in most EU member states. In both cases TSOs should charge prices that ensure a cost-effective operation of the network, without any cross-subsidies. That means if budgetary costs rise due to some adaptation of energy networks by state-owned TSOs, these costs should be reflected by higher transmission fees ultimately charged from the consumer. So finally, from an economic point of view the end consumers will be affected and not the public purse, 
Energy demand
Adaptation of demand is likely to result in more demand for cooling and less demand for heating energy. Although this behaviour seems trivial and could be interpreted as a form of impact, it fulfils the criteria of a reactive adaptation measure, as defined by the IPCC (IPCC 2007). Therefore, it will be included in this analysis. Tol 2002 estimates a net effect of additional energy costs adding up to over 6 billion € p.a. in European OECD countries (Tol 2002) . Another study suggests net savings due to decreased heating needs and increased electricity needs for cooling of ca. 28 billion € in 2050 in the total EU27 plus Norway and Switzerland (Jochem and Schade 2009 members, a ratio of 10-15% seems reasonable, which means that 10-15% of the demand adjustment effect will affect the public budgets. Expressed in figures, this means that in the total EU energy costs may rise by 600 million € to 1 billion € p.a. due to the cooling of public buildings (Tol 2002) . Contrary, basing on the study of Jochem and Schade (2009) , there will be energy cost savings for the public purse amounting to 2.7 to 4.2 billion € in 2050. These values, however, underlie high uncertainty with regard to the technological development within the 21 st century.
Transport
In the transport sector, cost estimates range from 3 to 6 billion € for the adaptation of infrastructure in the EU27 plus Norway and Switzerland in 2050 (Jochem and Schade 2009 ).
Beside impacts on traffic safety, the infrastructure is the most critical issue in the transport sector. Governmental intervention in the transport sector is mainly reasoned by market failure issues. Road networks which are free of charge and open to the public constitute a public good. There are, however, roads and other transport infrastructure co-financed by user fees, but the bulk of transport networks in Europe (in terms of km) are still free of charge, and mostly financed by the public sector. Furthermore privately owned roads and railways exist.
Unfortunately, data of ownership structures is not available on the EU level. Knowledge about the private and public ownerships of the networks would provide a basis for an attempt to propose the government share of adaptation expenditures. Nevertheless, the share is expected to be high (we assume more than 90%), due to high public engagement in the transport infrastructure. Even if there are possibilities to exclude users from road services and thereby introduce user-fees, governmental intervention may occur due to security-of-supply and equity rationales. If user-fee-based networks fail to provide an adequate quantity (e.g. distribution of airports or railway stations over the country) and quality (e.g. paved roads) of infrastructure, the government may step in to ensure the access to transport services for each region and each member of society in need. Thereby the public share of total adaptation investments may rise beyond the actual share of public network infrastructure. We assume 95%, admitting that this is a rough guess which can only serve as a first attempt to approach the actual public burden. This would translate in absolute budgetary costs of approximately 2.9 to 5.7 billion € for infrastructure in the EU27 plus Norway and Switzerland in 2050.
CONCLUSION
In the previous sections we developed a method to valuate the direct budgetary effect of adaptation to climate change and gave data-based and informed guesses of public costs to be expected based on literature on adaptation costs. These numerical conclusions can only serve as a first rough insight into the fiscal effects of adaptation, ignoring indirect effects and covering only few impact sectors. Moreover, due to a lack of detailed data, we could not derive public costs in the cross-sectoral impact sector "Extreme weather events". Admittedly, according to the literature review the highest adaptation costs may occur there. But as there is no information available which actors are affected by these costs and how exactly the costs arise, it is to date not possible to determine the specific degree of governmental affection.
Therefore, the used methodology could not be applied here. However, the results highlight certain impact fields with relatively high public costs, compared to others where the total adaptation costs may be high, but the public burden is expectedly low. Although the uncertainty is still very high, this analysis can serve as a first, theory-grounded and reasonable insight of which sectors cause which magnitude of budgetary effects.
A APPENDIX -DESCRIPTION OF THE MATRIX
Regional coverage
The first column of the matrix indicates the region for which the costs are estimated. Note that for European adaptation costs some studies refer to total Europe, some to the EU in a specific composition and others to the European OECD countries. Particularly problematic are the figures for Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, as only a small and unknown part of these figures are attributable to current EU member states. Interpreting the entries of the matrix, this has to be kept in mind.
Scenarios
In the second column, the climate scenarios and socio-economic scenarios which form the basis for any calculation or estimation are named. This information is particularly important to classify the subsequent results and to get an insight whether they are rather optimistic or pessimistic. Moreover, in studies with identical regional covering and scenarios, time spans and methodologies can be compared. Unfortunately, the inadequate data provides us with hardly more than one comparable country-specific study. Nevertheless, as knowledge about adaptation costs is evolving, there may be the opportunity to gradually fill the numerous gaps in the matrix. This is possible only under the condition that the development of climate science does not lead to significantly new scenarios, because then again results would lose their direct comparability.
Beside the scenarios regarding climate and socio-economic developments, adaptation scenarios are of great relevance. For example, there is a fundamental difference between the assumption of "total protection" of the current shoreline (i.e. protecting the land from every possible storm surge) and the assumption of "optimal coastal protection", which would incorporate the costs of protection into the decision. In the latter case abandoning highly endangered areas will be the consequence and the total costs will be lower than in the former case. In the real world, there is often a policy of determining a certain protection level, since the realisation of optimal protection is not always practicable due to lack of relevant data. A protection level of, say 1:400 means that the protection structures are designed to resist an event which statistically occurs every 400 years only. By setting these lump-sum protection levels the policy-makers avoid extensive cost-benefit-calculations for each coastal site. For the magnitude of adaptation costs, these adaptation decisions are of course crucial and every policy change significantly changes the involved costs.
3.
Time coverage and annualisation
Sometimes the cost estimates are calculated for only one point in time in the future, e.g. 2050, and sometimes they are estimated for a series of consecutive years, e.g. the annual value will occur every year between 2020 and 2030. Hence, the year (respectively period) is indicated in the fourth column. By comparing estimates from similar studies with different time horizons, one can find an increase in expected adaptation costs over time. This is not surprising as climate damages increase over time, which also induces higher adaptation needs.
Few sources give detailed information on annual costs for a given time period. One of them is Policy Research Corporation (2009), which names the scheduled expenditures for coastal protection by reviewing national and regional master plans up to 2015. In these cases we only
give the average annual costs. As long as the annual amounts do not differ considerably, this is reasonable -in the other cases we have indicated the exact annual costs.
For reasons of comparability we derived the annual costs if costs were given for a time period longer than one year. That is, numbers calculated for a period of N years were divided by N to receive the annual costs. This implies basically two simplifying assumptions: Firstly, adaptation costs are assumed to be constant over time. In reality, adaptation costs may increase over time (see above); but as no information about the exact distribution is given we choose the equal distribution. Secondly, we ignore inflation. The presented data are in prices of 2005 and therefore do not reflect price changes over time. The simple division by N does not, however, assume a discount rate of zero. The matrix just gives the estimated adaptation costs which may occur at a future point of time. We do not calculate these future costs in present values -only in this case discounting would become relevant.
After all, the matrix cannot provide a detailed budget-like expenditure plan for adaptation in the coming decades. It can just serve as a first rough insight into expected costs, partly based on best-guess-results.
The division into impact sectors
The presented adaptation costs are partitioned into different impact fields, as most adaptation measures are to reduce damages in specific sectors and can therefore be assigned to these sectors.
Special attention should be paid to the cross section sector "Weather Extremes". The literature cited in the matrix refers primarily to costs arising from adaptation of the constructed infrastructure, i.e. making the structures resilient to extreme weather events. These costs are hardly attributable to any impact sector. At the same time, they are quite high, e.g. up to an annual value of 50.9 billion € in the 2060s for Western Europe (Bosello et al. 2009 ).
By the partition into different impact sectors the matrix provides a first insight into the current state of research of adaptation costs. It becomes clear that to date most cost estimates refer to coastal protection. It should not be derived, however, that this is the sector with the highest costs. It is just saying that here the impacts and adaptation techniques are quite well studied and the costs are well known, given an assumption for the future sea-level rise. In fact, the global adaptation cost study of UNFCCC (2007) estimates the costs of coastal protection in 2030 at a comparably low level. Adaptation in other fields like agriculture, forestry, fisheries, ecosystems, and -most outstanding -infrastructure will be much costlier, according to this source. However, these estimates come with a high level of uncertainty, whereas the knowledge of coastal protection costs is relatively well developed. On the other side, by comparing the sector-specific entries of coastal protection one can see a wide range of results even in that best-established research field. For great parts the differences can be reasoned by different assumptions regarding the sea-level rise or protection level, which is then indicated in the "Scenario" column.
The last column named "Total" contains results of studies not focussing on specific sectors, but on the total impact of adaptation costs on social welfare. There are only very few studies available which try to aggregate adaptation costs throughout the total economy. In principal,
we can also sum up the entries of one line in the matrix to calculate the direct costs of adaptation in the analysed sectors and thereby yield an approximate value for total direct adaptation costs in the economy. A prerequisite of this addition would be the use of identical scenarios, regional and time coverage, division into impact sectors and methods. Thus, the data actually do not allow a reasonable addition of single values due to lack of comparable results. Note that additional indirect effects mentioned in the introductory section are completely neglected if we just added up the different sector impacts.
Exchange rates and inflation
The numerical entries in the matrix are -if not indicated otherwise -annual adaptation costs in million €, in prices of 2005, and thereby comparable in terms of currency and price levels.
The column named "Exchange and inflation" gives the original value found in primary literature and the calculation to € in prices of 2005. For the translation of USD into € we used the average market exchange rate of the year of the respective study.
